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CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 1068 
  
This Article uses the September 2017 defamation decision in 
Simmons v. American Media, Inc. as a springboard for examining 
defamatory meaning and reputational injury. Specifically, it focuses 
on cases in which judges acknowledge that plaintiffs have suffered 
reputational harm yet rule for defendants because promoting the 
cultural value of equality weighs against redress. In Simmons, a 
normative, axiological judgment—that the law should neither 
sanction nor ratify prejudicial views about transgender individuals—
prevailed at the trial court level over a celebrity’s ability to recover for 
alleged reputational harm. Simmons sits at a dangerous intersection: 
a crossroads where a noble judicial desire to reject prejudicial 
stereotypes and to embrace equality collides head-on with an ignoble 
reality in which a significant minority of the population finds a 
particular false allegation (in Simmons, transgender status) to be 
defamatory. This Article examines how courts historically determined 
defamatory meaning and how once-defamatory per se statements 
about sexual orientation are not always considered so today. When 
viewed beyond a legal lens, however, research suggests transgender 
individuals have not witnessed the same benefits of that altered 
perspective. There is a key difference between attitudes about sexual 
orientation and attitudes about sexual identity. The Article concludes 
by proposing variables for courts to apply in future cases where a 
dispute exists over whether an allegation is defamatory per se, rather 
than leaving the decision to the discretion of judges untethered from 
formal criteria. 
  




In September 2017, California Superior Court Judge Gregory 
Keosian1 dismissed weight-loss legend2 and aerobicizologist3 Richard 
Simmons’ libel4 suit against the National Enquirer in Simmons v. 
American Media, Inc.5 In doing so, Keosian tackled what he called 
“an issue of first impression in California.”6 That question was 
whether falsely stating a person is transgender naturally tends to 
cause reputational harm.7 The judge ultimately concluded that “even 
if there is a sizeable portion of the population who would view being 
transgender as a negative,”8 he would “not validate those prejudices 
by legally recognizing them.”9  
Because Keosian held that falsely labeling someone transgender 
was not defamatory per se,10 Simmons was forced under California 
                                                                                                                                
 
 1. Keosian was appointed to the superior court in May 2002 by former 
California Governor Gray Davis. Kimberly Edds, Davis Appoints Three Private 
Practitioners to Superior Court, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (L.A.), May 23, 
2002, at 1. As a litigator in private practice prior to his judgeship, Keosian focused 
“on civil tort litigation and representing plaintiffs in personal injury cases.” Id. 
Richard Simmons is not the only celebrity over whose case Keosian has presided. In 
October 2014, for example, he dismissed the case of a woman who sued National 
Basketball Association player Kris Humphries for allegedly giving her herpes. 
Cheryl Johnson, Humphries May Sue Herpes Accuser, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), 
Oct. 23, 2014, at 2B.  
2. See, e.g., Donna Gable, Simmons Drops by ‘Shade’ to Help Folks Drop 
Pounds, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 3D (calling Simmons a “weight loss guru”); 
Jumpin’ Jack Cash, N.Y. POST, Sept. 6, 2017, at 12 (dubbing Simmons an “enigmatic 
fitness guru”). 
 3.  Stanley Elkin, Talk Up! The First Amendment as an Art Form, GRAND 
STREET, Winter 1989, at 94, 101. 
 4.  Under California law applicable in Simmons’ case, libel—along with 
slander—is a subset of defamation. CAL. CIV. CODE § 44 (West 2017). Libel, in turn, 
is statutorily defined as “a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, 
picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to 
hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, 
or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Id. § 45. 
 5.  Ruling at 1, Simmons v. Am. Media, Inc., No. BC660633 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. Cty. Sept. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Simmons Order], 
https://www.scribd.com/document/358305250/Simmons-v-AMI-Ruling#from_embed. 
 6.  Id. at 6. 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Id. at 11. 
 9.  Id. at 9. 
 10.  Id. at 6; see also Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo. App. 1991) 
(“Historically, defamation was actionable per se only if the defamatory remark 
imputed a criminal offense; a venereal or loathsome and communicable disease; 
improper conduct of a lawful business; or unchastity by a woman.”); 1 ROBERT D. 
SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2:8.1 
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law to demonstrate special damages in order to prevail.11 Special 
damages, as defined by the relevant statute in Simmons, are 
“damages that [the] plaintiff alleges and proves that he or she has 
suffered in respect to his or her property, business, trade, profession, 
or occupation, including the amounts of money the plaintiff alleges 
and proves he or she has expended as a result of the alleged libel, 
and no other.”12 Unfortunately for the fitness guru, he “introduce[d] 
no evidence of any ‘special damages’ from the alleged defamation.”13 
In fact, Simmons actually “appear[ed] to concede . . . that he did not 
suffer any special damages.”14   
Keosian, thus, dismissed Simmons’ lawsuit15 under California’s 
anti-SLAPP16 statute.17 Adding pecuniary insult to alleged 
                                                                                                                                
 
(5th ed. 2012) (“A libelous or slanderous communication that, under the law of the 
relevant jurisdiction, can support a cause of action without proof of special damages 
is referred to as libel per se or slander per se, respectively. No concept in the law of 
defamation has created more confusion.”); Robert D. Richards, Gay Labeling and 
Defamation Law: Have Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Changed Enough to Modify 
Reputational Torts?, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 349, 356 (2010) (“Defamation per 
se is premised upon the notion that some statements are so inherently malevolent 
that they, without need for further elaboration, expose the subject to scorn.”). 
 11.  See Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 6 (concluding that “misidentification 
of a person as transgender is not actionable defamation absent special damages”); see 
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 2017) (“Defamatory language not libelous on its 
face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered 
special damage as a proximate result thereof.”). The Supreme Court of California 
explained more than half a century ago that “[t]he purpose of the rule requiring proof 
of special damages when the defamatory meaning does not appear on the face of the 
language used is to protect publishers who make statements innocent in themselves 
that are defamatory only because of extrinsic facts known to the reader.” MacLeod v. 
Tribune Publ’g Co., 343 P.2d 36, 43 (Cal. 1959). 
 12.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(d)(2) (West 2017). 
 13.  See Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 5. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id. at 1. 
 16.  SLAPP is an acronym “standing for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation.” ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM’S: THE PERILOUS PRESENT AND 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1998). Such lawsuits are “aimed 
at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who 
have done so.” Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore, 230 P.3d 1117, 1123 (Cal. 2010).   
  Anti-SLAPP statutes, in turn, are “laws enacted to deter strategic lawsuits 
against public participation (SLAPPs), or lawsuits that plaintiffs bring principally to 
chill the valid exercise of First Amendment speech and petition rights.” Lili Levi, The 
Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New Threat to 
Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 822 (2017). Anti-SLAPP statutes, although 
varying in terms from state to state, “generally work in the same way: they provide 
defendants a special, expedited procedure to seek a quick dismissal of the case, and 
they install cost-shifting provisions that attempt to economically disincentivize the 
filing of a frivolous suit.” Robert T. Sherwin, Evidence? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ 
Evidence!: How Ambiguity in Some States’ Anti-SLAPP Laws Threatens to De-Fang a 
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reputational injury, the judge also allowed the National Enquirer to 
file for attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under the anti-SLAPP 
law.18 Those fees totaled more than $200,00019—a sum that 
Simmons’ attorney Neville Johnson20 blasted in January 2018 as a 
“billing fiesta”21 and “the kind of request that gives lawyers a bad 
name.”22  
The decision against the waggish workout buff was hailed by 
some as a victory for the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer 
(“LGBTQ”) community.23 Furthermore, it comports with multiple 
                                                                                                                                
 
Popular and Powerful Weapon Against Frivolous Litigation, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
431, 433 (2017).  
 17.  CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16 (West 2017). 
 18.  See Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 1; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 
425.16(c)(1) (West 2017) (providing that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion 
to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs”). 
 19.  Tim Kenneally, Richard Simmons Ordered to Pay National Enquirer’s 
Legal Fees in Transgender Story Lawsuit, WRAP (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.thewrap.com/richard-simmons-ordered-to-pay-national-enquirers-legal-
fees-in-transgender-story-lawsuit/; Richard Simmons’ Enquirer Lawsuit May Cost 
Him More than $220k, TMZ (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.tmz.com/2017/11/06/richard-
simmons-enquirer-lawsuit-attorneys-fees/.  
 20.  In a 2004 profile, Johnson was described as “the man to whom many 
plaintiffs now turn when it comes to suing the media” and who, along with Atlanta-
based L. Lin Wood, is “the go-to attorney for plaintiffs seeking redress for disparaged 
reputations and privacy invasions.” Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Suing the 
Media, Supporting the First Amendment: The Paradox of Neville Johnson and the 
Battle for Privacy, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2004). 
 21.  Melissa Daniels, Richard Simmons Slams ‘Billing Fiesta’ in Defamation 
Suit, LAW360 (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1007565/richard-
simmons-slams-billing-fiesta-in-defamation-suit. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  See, e.g., Kenzie Bryant, Richard Simmons’s Loss Could be Transgender 
Rights’ Gain, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2017/08/richard-simmons-transgender-libel-lawsuit 
(asserting that “though Simmons will likely lose, it could prove an unlikely legal 
victory for transgender-rights advocates”); Michael Hiltzik, By Tossing a Richard 
Simmons Libel Case, a Judge Strikes a Blow Against Transgender Discrimination, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-
simmons-transgender-20170901-story.html (“This week, Judge Gregory Keosian 
issued a tentative ruling that could strike a major blow for gender equality before the 
law. He found that whether it’s true or not that Simmons underwent the transition 
as the Enquirer reported, it’s simply not libelous or defamatory to call someone 
transgender.”); Anthony Michael Kreis, Judge: Calling Someone Trans Isn’t 
Defamatory Because There’s Nothing Wrong with Being Trans, SLATE (Sept. 15, 
2017),http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/09/15/richard_simmons_loses_ 
lawsuits_on_transgender_defamation.html (asserting that “transgender Americans 
achieved a little-noticed but critical legal victory in a California state court. Judge 
Gregory Keosian announced he will dismiss fitness guru Richard Simmons’ 
defamation lawsuit in which Simmons claimed reputational harm after the National 
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recent rulings holding that a false accusation of being gay is not 
defamatory per se.24 These opinions contrast with older cases 
reaching the opposite conclusion.25 
In the process of ruling for the National Enquirer and securing a 
supposed win for LGBTQ equality, Judge Keosian also seemingly 
gave short shrift to the reputational harm Simmons allegedly 
suffered. As Neville Johnson put it, “[t]his is not a victory for 
transgender rights, but rather for the ability to publish false 
information meant to impugn and ridicule another.”26 In brief, “the 
clown prince of fitness”27 was not laughing when his case was 
elevated from an individual lawsuit into a larger cultural battle over 
LGBTQ rights and when the greater good of societal equality 
triumphed over personal need—or, at least, desire—for redress. 
Simmons’ co-counsel Rodney Smolla bluntly called Keosian’s 
decision an “exercise of idealism” rather than “realism.”28 
                                                                                                                                
 
Enquirer falsely called him a transgender woman”); Nico Lang, ‘Calling Someone 
Transgender is Not An Insult’: Landmark Ruling in Richard Simmons Case, INTO 
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.intomore.com/impact/calling-someone-transgender-is-
not-an-insult-landmark-ruling-in-richard-simmons-case/7c95df4baa16412a 
(reporting that “advocates say that the ruling is an unusual victory for LGBTQ 
rights,” and adding that “Lambda Legal, the national LGBTQ civil rights 
organization, applauded the judge’s ruling”). 
 24.  See, e.g., Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean Univ., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 143, 
156 (D.P.R. 2016) (concluding that “falsely accusing someone of being 
a homosexual can no longer be considered slander per se”); Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. 
Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that statements “are not defamatory per 
se merely because they impute homosexuality,” with then-U.S. District Judge Denny 
Chin stating prior that “[w]hile I certainly agree that gays and lesbians continue to 
face prejudice, I respectfully disagree that the existence of this continued prejudice 
leads to the conclusion that there is a widespread view of gays and lesbians as 
contemptible and disgraceful”); Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D. 
Mass. 2004) (acknowledging that while “a segment of the community views 
homosexuals as immoral,” the judiciary “should not, directly or indirectly, give effect 
to these prejudices. If this Court were to agree that calling someone a homosexual is 
defamatory per se—it would, in effect, validate that sentiment and legitimize 
relegating homosexuals to second-class status”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Manale v. City of New Orleans Dep’t of Police, 673 F.2d 122, 125 
(5th Cir. 1982) (concluding that statements labeling the plaintiff “gay” and a 
“fruit” were defamatory per se). 
 26.  Nancy Dillon, Simmons’ ‘Trans Libel’ Suit Nixed, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), 
Sept. 6, 2017, at 3. 
 27.  Kathy Mackay, Former Fatty Richard Simmons is the Grand Duke of 
Diet and the Clown Prince of Fitness, PEOPLE (Apr. 13, 1981), 
http://people.com/archive/former-fatty-richard-simmons-is-the-grand-duke-of-
diet-and-the-clown-prince-of-fitness-vol-15-no-14/. 
 28.  Nancy Dillon, Sweatin’ it Out: Simmons Lawsuit Against Enquirer in 
Trouble, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 31, 2017, at News 16. 
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This Article examines the tension laid bare in Simmons between 
individual recovery for reputational harm, on the one hand, and the 
legal system’s desire not to endorse or validate prejudicial views 
against certain classes of individuals, on the other. Phrased as a 
research question: when should courts, “acting as guardians of 
public morality,”29 hold that certain false accusations are not 
defamatory per se even when those accusations are viewed 
negatively by “a substantial and respectable minority”30 of the 
community? More colloquially and colorfully, when is it okay for a 
judge to throw an individual who suffered reputational harm under 
the bus31 for the sake of a larger social cause? 
To contextualize this issue, Part I analyzes Simmons v. 
American Media, Inc., delving beyond the court’s opinion and into 
the parties’ pleadings and arguments, including the National 
Enquirer’s motion to strike Simmons’ complaint under California’s 
anti-SLAPP statute.32 Part II has two sections—the first reviews 
how courts typically determine defamatory meaning, while the 
second analyzes the evolution of false allegations of homosexuality 
and other false allegations that once were defamatory per se but are 
not necessarily so today.33 Next, Part III moves beyond the legal 
realm to explore data and research regarding current societal 
attitudes in the United States toward transgender individuals.34 
Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting criteria for courts to 
deploy in future cases like Simmons where individual reputational 
harm is pitted against the law’s desire to reject rulings that embrace 
prejudice.35 
  
                                                                                                                                
 
 29.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971). 
 30.  See Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the 
Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1377 (2011) (“A statement can have a defamatory 
effect even if it resonates only with ‘a substantial and respectable minority,’ 
assuming that the audience is a creditable one.”). 
 31.  See Word History: Why Do We ‘Throw Someone Under the Bus’? Let’s Blame 
the British, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-
play/why-do-we-throw-someone-under-the-bus (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (discussing 
the origins and meaning of the phrase “throw someone under the bus”). 
 32.  See infra notes 36–121 and accompanying text. 
 33.  See infra notes 122–227 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See infra notes 228–84 and accompanying text. 
 35.  See infra notes 285–302 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE LAWSUIT: A PRIMER ON RICHARD SIMMONS’ CASE AGAINST THE 
NATIONAL ENQUIRER 
 
Richard Simmons sued the National Enquirer and its owner, 
American Media, Inc., in state court in Los Angeles County, 
California in May 2017.36 The suit, which now is on appeal,37 
features four causes of action for libel and one count of false light 
invasion of privacy.38 It pivots on the June 20, 2016 issue of the 
tabloid.39 That issue’s cover claims Simmons had: (1) transitioned 
from a man to a woman; (2) undergone castration surgery; and (3) 
received a “secret boob job.”40   
Inside the issue, an article leads with the claim that “[w]eight 
loss expert Richard Simmons has undergone shocking sex swap 
surgery to change from a man to a woman—and The National 
Enquirer has the eye-popping world exclusive photos to prove it.”41 It 
adds, among other tidbits, that Simmons “hid in his nearly $5 
million Hollywood Hills mansion for two long years as he slowly 
transformed into a female with breast implants, hormone 
treatments and medical consultations on castration.”42 
                                                                                                                                
 
 36.  Complaint at 1, Simmons v. Am. Media, Inc., No. BC660633 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. L.A. Cty. May 8, 2017) [hereinafter Simmons Complaint], 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3705625-Simmons.html. The complaint 
also named as a defendant Radar Online, LLC, which—as with the National 
Enquirer—is owned by American Media and is the online counterpart to the 
National Enquirer.  
 37.  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Simmons v. Am. Media, Inc., Court of 
Appeal No. B285988 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018). 
 38.  Simmons Complaint, supra note 36, at 1. Under California law, false light 
invasion of privacy is considered substantively the same as libel, and a plaintiff 
suing for false light, thus, must prove the same requirements as libel. Tamkin v. 
CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). A California 
statute, which targets such duplicativeness, makes it clear that: 
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages 
for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded 
upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as one 
issue of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation 
to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any 
one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall 
include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in 
all jurisdictions. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3425.3 (West 2017). 
 39.  Simmons Complaint, supra note 36, at 6, Ex. 1. Although the date on the 
issue is June 20, 2016, the issue was actually published earlier on June 8, 2016. Id. 
at 6. 
 40.  Id. at 6, Ex. 1. 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
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Shortly after the article was published, Simmons denounced it as 
false, claiming “he was not transitioning from a male to a female.”43 
The complaint in Simmons characterizes his public statement as an 
“unequivocal denial of the gender transitioning story.”44 
In a nutshell, Simmons’ complaint alleges that the article, 
headlines, photos, and cover of the June 20, 2016 edition of the 
National Enquirer falsely insinuate he “has and continues to 
undergo sex-change surgery.”45 The complaint avers that Simmons’ 
“case is about a particularly egregious and hurtful campaign of 
defamations and privacy invasions, falsely asserting that Mr. 
Simmons is transitioning from a male to a female, including 
‘shocking sex surgery,’ breast implants, hormone treatments, and 
consultations on medical castration.”46  
In July 2017, the National Enquirer filed a motion to strike the 
complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.47 To avoid having 
a cause of action dismissed under this provision, a plaintiff—here, 
Richard Simmons—must establish “a probability” of prevailing on 
the claim.48 This means “a plaintiff must make a prima facie 
showing of facts which would, if proved, support a judgment in his or 
her favor.”49 
A key element, in turn, of establishing a libel claim in California 
is proving a statement conveys a defamatory meaning such that it: 
(1) exposes the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy; (2) 
causes the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; or (3) injures the 
plaintiff in his occupation.50 If, however, a statement is not libelous 
per se—if a defamatory meaning is not clear from the face of the 
statement and, instead, is recognized only with extrinsic 
                                                                                                                                
 
 43.  Id. at 7. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. at 10.  
 46.  Id. at 2. 
 47.  Notice of Motion and Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint; Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 1, Simmons v. Am. 
Media Inc., No. BC660633 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. July 26, 2017) [hereinafter 
Motion to Strike]. 
 48.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2017). In addition to the 
probability-of-prevailing facet, California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies only if the 
defendant (the target or victim of the SLAPP) was acting in furtherance of his “right 
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California 
Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Id. A discussion of the “public issue” 
element is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 49.  Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 50.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2017). 
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“explanatory matter”51—then a plaintiff must additionally allege and 
prove special damages to prevail.52 Special damages, as noted 
earlier,53 are those that a “plaintiff alleges and proves that he or she 
has suffered in respect to his or her property, business, trade, 
profession, or occupation, including the amounts of money the 
plaintiff alleges and proves he or she has expended as a result of the 
alleged libel, and no other.”54  
The National Enquirer’s motion to strike thus pivoted on two key 
arguments:  
 
(1) Richard Simmons could not establish a probability of 
winning because a false allegation of being transgender is not 
libelous per se;55 and  
(2) Simmons failed to plead the requisite special damages to 
prevail when a statement is not libelous per se.56   
 
It is the first argument that lies at the heart of this Article. The 
National Enquirer’s logic here was straightforward, with the 
tabloid’s attorneys contending that: 
 
[s]tatements that someone is transgender, or undergoing a 
gender transition, do not impute the kind of inherently 
shameful  or odious characteristic that can support a 
defamation claim in modern times.  Just as with false 
imputations of race or homosexuality, which once were 
                                                                                                                                
 
 51.  Id. § 45a. As a California appellate court described the difference between 
libel per se and libel per quod in the Golden State: 
If . . . a reader would perceive a defamatory meaning without 
extrinsic aid beyond his or her own intelligence and common 
sense, then . . . there is a libel per se. But if the reader would be 
able to recognize a defamatory meaning only by virtue of his or her 
knowledge of specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the 
publication, which are not matters of common knowledge 
rationally attributable to all reasonable persons, then . . . the libel 
cannot be libel per se but will be libel per quod. 
Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); 
see also ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS 
COMMUNICATION 156 (6th ed. 2018) (“Some kinds of statements convey such 
defamatory meaning that they are considered to be defamatory as a matter of law; on 
its face and without further proof, the content is defamatory. This is libel per se.”). 
 52.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 2017). 
 53.  Supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 54.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(d)(2) (West 2017). 
 55.  Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 12. 
 56.  Id. at 12–13.  
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considered defamatory, being referred to as “transgender” 
cannot rationally be held by a court to impute negative 
characteristics.57  
 
Unpacking this statement reveals two key points. First, it 
stresses that what once was defamatory may not be so today.58 
Contemporary context, in other words, is key.59 The National 
Enquirer, therefore, argued that “as society’s mores and values 
evolve, assertions that might have been offensive to a past 
generation may no longer be defamatory.”60 Attorneys for the tabloid 
cited four examples of assertions that, although defamatory per se in 
the past, are no longer held so today by some courts. These include 
false allegations a person: (1) has cancer;61 (2) was born out of 
wedlock;62 (3) is black;63 and (4) is homosexual.64   
The most recent of these to switch to non-defamatory per se 
status,65 at least for some courts—although certainly not all66—is 
                                                                                                                                
 
 57.  Id. at 12. 
 58.  See CLAY CALVERT ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 164 (20th ed. 2018) (“What 
is considered defamatory will vary by location and change over time.”). 
 59.  See Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 20 (“Whether a statement is 
defamatory is not evaluated by any static test. Context is critical.”). 
 60.  Id. at 21. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. at 22. 
 65.  Importantly, a false imputation of homosexuality can still be held 
defamatory per quod, even if it is not defamatory per se. Haven Ward, “I’m Not Gay, 
M’kay?”: Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual be Defamatory?, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 739, 758–59 (2010) (“No court has ruled that the misidentification of someone 
as homosexual is not defamatory as a matter of law. Although all courts have found 
such statements defamatory, the courts are divided as to whether they constitute 
defamation per se or per quod.”). 
 66.  In 2008, a federal district court in New York concluded that imputations of 
homosexuality are slanderous per se. Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa 
Per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d 520, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). United States District Judge 
Colleen McMahon largely based her decision in Gallo “on the fact that the 
prejudice gays and lesbians experience is real and sufficiently widespread so that it 
would be premature to declare victory. If the degree of this widespread prejudice 
disappears, this Court welcomes the red flag that will attach to this decision.” Id. at 
549–50.   
  Two years later, a federal district court in Texas reasoned that “judicial 
caution requires the Court to acknowledge that the imputation of homosexuality 
might as a matter of fact expose a person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.” 
Robinson v. Radio One, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (N.D. Tex. 2010). In doing so, 
Judge Reed O’Connor allowed the plaintiff to proceed with discovery and called the 
question of whether falsely labeling someone gay is defamatory per se “ripe for the 
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homosexuality.67 Professor Jay Barth observes that “[h]istorically, 
American courts have generally found that falsely identifying 
someone as gay, lesbian, or bisexual (LGB) was defamation per se.”68 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,69 
however, propelled a shift away from this position.70   
In Lawrence, the Court declared an anti-sodomy statute 
unconstitutional, thereby decriminalizing gay sexual practices.71 
This proved pivotal for libel law. Prior to Lawrence, “the large 
majority of the courts that [had] found an accusation of 
homosexuality to be defamatory per se emphasized the fact that 
such a statement imputed criminal conduct.”72 This logic, in turn, 
hinged on the fact that “[f]alse statements imputing criminal activity 
are among the categories of speech that are presumed to 
be defamatory per se.”73 Lawrence rendered nugatory this criminal-
activity rationale for declaring false accusations of homosexuality to 
be defamatory per se.74 
Critically for purposes of Simmons, however, California’s 
statutory definition of libel per se does not delineate it by specific 
categories of content such as imputations of criminal conduct.75 
                                                                                                                                
 
clarification that comes from allowing litigation to proceed rather than the 
imposition of a single judge’s view.” Id. at 428 n.4. 
 67.  In contrast to the homosexuality line of defamation cases, racial 
misidentification claims largely disappeared in the 1950s. See Lyrissa Barnett 
Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
30 (1996) (“Although a great many cases where plaintiffs sued over a false statement 
that they were African-American appeared in the reporters prior to 1950, after that 
date they began to disappear.”). 
 68.  Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still 
Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 527, 527 (2012). 
 69.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 70.  See Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean Univ., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 143, 155–56 
(D.P.R. 2016) (noting that in light of Lawrence, “recent case law holds that falsely 
accusing a person of being a homosexual is not slander per se” and concluding that 
“falsely accusing someone of being a homosexual can no longer be considered slander 
per se”); Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that “to 
the extent that courts previously relied on the criminality of homosexual conduct in 
holding that a statement imputing homosexuality subjects a person to contempt and 
ridicule . . . Lawrence has foreclosed such reliance”). 
 71.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Texas statute at issue in Lawrence 
criminalized anal sex between members of the same sex, classifying it as deviant 
sexual intercourse. Id. at 562–63.   
 72.  Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 73.  Holly Miller, Homosexuality as Defamation: A Proposal for the Use of the 
“Right-Thinking Minds” Approach in the Development of Modern Jurisprudence, 18 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 356 (2013). 
 74.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 75.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 2017). 
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Rather, a statement is libelous on its face if its defamatory meaning 
exists “without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an 
inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact.”76 In other words, in 
California, “libel . . . is per se when defamatory on its face.”77   
This constitutes “an expansive view in interpreting the viability 
of a claim for libel per se,”78 and California courts, in turn, “have 
used the libel statute to broaden the scope of per se liability.”79 As 
Professor Robert Richards notes, “California has expanded the reach 
of defamation per se in other circumstances,”80 stretching beyond 
“the traditional ground of imputation of criminal behavior.”81 
It is only California’s definition of slander (the spoken form of 
defamation)82 that articulates a cause of action in terms of a 
statement that “[c]harges any person with crime, or with having 
been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime.”83 All of this 
significantly mitigates, if not eliminates, the impact of Lawrence’s 
decriminalization of certain homosexual practices on the libel per se 
issue in California. 
The second and related key point is the National Enquirer’s 
effort to analogize recent judicial acceptance of homosexuality as a 
non-defamatory per se state of sexual orientation to transgenderism 
as a state of gender identity. In other words, one might ask: if it is 
not defamatory per se today to falsely say someone is gay, then why 
should it not also be non-defamatory per se to falsely say someone is 
transgender? As the National Enquirer contended, “Simmons’ 
assertion that it is libelous to state a person is transitioning genders 
rests entirely on the same kind of outdated prejudices about 
transgender individuals that have been widely rejected in analogous 
circumstances.”84 
                                                                                                                                
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Regalia v. Nethercutt Collection, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009). 
 78.  Andrew Bossory, Defamation Per Se: Be Prepared to Plead (and Prove!) 
Actual Damages, AM. B. ASS’N (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/business-torts-unfair-
competition/articles/2014/defamation-prepared-plead/. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Richards, supra note 10, at 361. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  See Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
17, 19 (2011) (defining slander as “spoken defamation” and libel as “written 
defamation”). 
 83.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 46 (West 2017). 
 84.  Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 23. 
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A glaring threshold problem with this logic, however, is that 
sexual orientation and gender identity simply are not the same 
thing.85 Sexual orientation, according to the Human Rights 
Campaign,86 is “[a]n inherent or immutable enduring emotional, 
romantic or sexual attraction to other people.”87 Gender identity, in 
contrast, “is the personal psychological experience of one’s own 
gender”88 or, more simply, “a person’s internal sense of being male, 
female or something else.”89 In brief, “sexual orientation is about 
who you are attracted to and fall in love with; gender identity is 
about who you are.”90 This means that homosexuality and 
transgenderism are distinct—a fact that the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged.91 The difference 
between sexual orientation and gender identity and, in turn, the 
distinction between homosexuality and transgenderism inevitably 
clouds and convolutes the National Enquirer’s effort to analogize 
them.  
The second problem with this reasoning is that although 
prejudices may be “outdated,” it does not mean that they do not exist 
and that transgender individuals do not suffer precisely the type of 
negative consequences for which libel law is intended to compensate. 
In other words, outdated prejudices—politically incorrect views, in 
the parlance of our times—still: (1) expose transgender individuals 
                                                                                                                                
 
 85.  The American Psychological Association explains that “[g]ender identity 
and sexual orientation are not the same. Sexual orientation refers to an individual’s 
enduring physical, romantic, and/or emotional attraction to another person, whereas 
gender identity refers to one’s internal sense of being male, female, or something 
else.” AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT TRANSGENDER 
PEOPLE, GENDER IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION 2 (2014), 
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.pdf. 
 86.  The Human Rights Campaign is “the largest civil rights organization 
working to achieve equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer 
Americans.” About Us, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/hrc-story/about-us 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 87. Glossary of Terms, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/resources/glossary-of-terms (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
88.   David M. Buck, Defining Transgender: What Do Lay Definitions Say About 
Prejudice?, 3 PSYCHOL. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER DIVERSITY 465, 465 
(2016). 
 89.  AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT 
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, GENDER IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION 1 (2014), 
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.pdf.  
 90.  Transgender FAQ, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/transgender/transfaq 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 91.  Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (“While 
the relationship between gender identity and sexual orientation is complex, and 
sometimes overlapping, the two identities are distinct.”).  
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to hatred, ridicule, and contempt; (2) cause them to be shunned and 
avoided; and (3) detrimentally affect them in their jobs.92 As 
Simmons’ attorney Rodney Smolla put it, the ruling against his 
client was an “exercise of idealism” rather than “realism.”93 
Beyond the National Enquirer’s dual foundational arguments—
that what is defamatory changes over time, and that shifts in how 
courts treat false allegations of homosexuality are analogous to how 
they should treat assertions of being transgender—the tabloid made 
a broader argument. As the motion to strike put it: 
 
The legal rule Simmons proposes—that gender transition is 
somehow shameful or odious— . . . would be contrary to 
California law and public policy, which recognize the dignity 
of transgender individuals and their right to equal treatment. 
California prohibits discrimination against transgender 
people, including in housing, employment, public 
accommodations, health insurance and school activities. 
California also was the first state to ban the “trans panic” 
defense in homicide cases.94 
 
The problem with this logic, of course, is that the legal right to 
equal treatment does not mean that, in the reality of their day-to-
day lives, transgender people are treated equally. In other words, 
California laws might bar discrimination against transgender 
individuals, but statutory symbolism does not mirror the real-world 
treatment of and attitudes toward transgender Californians. Part III 
of this Article, in fact, provides data and scholarly research revealing 
the discrimination that transgender people experience daily.95 
To address this apparent weakness in its argument, the National 
Enquirer averred that while “there are still people who are biased 
against gay people,”96 it violates public policy for courts to recognize 
such prejudice via a defamatory per se classification. As the motion 
to strike contended, “[t]ransgender individuals may still face 
                                                                                                                                
 
 92.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2017) (defining libel, in key part, as a 
publication that “exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or 
which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in 
his occupation”). 
 93.  Dillon, supra note 28, at News 16. 
 94.  Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 23 (emphasis added). 
 95.  See infra notes 228–84 . 
 96.  Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 22. 
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prejudice, but that does not justify finding, as a legal matter, that 
they are contemptible or disgraceful.”97 
In September 2017, Judge Keosian granted the National 
Enquirer’s motion to strike.98 Critical to this decision was Keosian’s 
analysis of the question, as he framed it, of whether “falsely 
reporting that a person is transgender [has] a natural tendency to 
injure one’s reputation.”99 The “natural tendency” language reflects 
how California courts have interpreted the state’s libel per se 
statute100 for deciding if a statement, in fact, is libelous per se.101 
That statute provides that “[a] libel which is defamatory of the 
plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an 
inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on 
its face.”102 Keosian concluded here that: 
 
because courts have long held that a misidentification of 
certain immutable characteristics do not naturally tend to 
injure one’s reputation, even if there is a sizeable portion of 
the population who hold prejudices against those 
characteristics, misidentification of a person as transgender 
is not actionable defamation absent special damages.103 
 
The “immutable characteristics”104 line of cases Keosian cited 
supporting this proposition included decisions addressing medical 
conditions, racial misidentification, and homosexuality.105 Focusing 
on false allegations of homosexuality, the judge noted that while 
“there is no connection between homosexuality and being 
transgender, both characteristics relate to sex and gender.”106 In 
brief, he cursorily dismissed the vital differences between sexual 
orientation (homosexuality) and gender identity (transgenderism) 
                                                                                                                                
 
 97.  Id. at 24. 
 98.  Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 1. 
 99.  Id. at 6. 
 100.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 2017). 
 101.  See MacLeod v. Tribune Publ’g Co., 343 P.2d 36, 41 (Cal. 1959) (“The Code 
definition of libel is very broad and has been held to include almost any language 
which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person’s reputation, either 
generally, or with respect to his occupation.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Bates v. 
Campbell, 2 P.2d 383, 385 (Cal. 1931)). 
 102.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 2017). 
 103.  Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 6. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. at 7–8. 
 106.  Id. at 8. 
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described earlier,107 perhaps for purposes of judicial expediency or 
for smoothing the path to reach his ultimate conclusion against 
Simmons. 
Although acknowledging that transgender individuals “may be 
held in contempt by a portion of the population,”108 Keosian decided 
“not [to] validate those prejudices by legally recognizing them.”109 
Keosian threw a sop to the discrimination faced by transgender 
individuals, noting he reviewed “the deplorable statistics relating 
to”110 them and contending his ruling did not imply “that the 
difficulties and bigotry facing transgender individuals is minimal or 
nonexistent.”111 What was paramount for Keosian, however, was not 
giving legal force and effect to prejudices against transgender 
individuals, regardless of whether “there is a sizeable portion of the 
population who view being transgender as negative.”112 
Thus, in a nifty bit of judicial jiu-jitsu, Keosian readily 
acknowledged substantial prejudice against transgender individuals 
yet simultaneously concluded “that being misidentified as 
transgender is not libelous per se because such identification does 
not expose ‘any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or 
which causes him to be to be shunned or avoided, or which has a 
tendency to injure him in his occupation.’”113 He worked his way 
around such apparent cognitive dissonance114 by focusing on the 
negative public policy ramifications of libel law recognizing a false 
accusation of being transgender as defamatory per se.115   
Viewed harshly and cynically, Judge Keosian ripped libel law 
from its venerable moorings as a dignitary tort116 designed to 
provide individual redress for reputational harm.117 He transformed 
                                                                                                                                
 
 107.  See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
 108.  Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 9.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at 11. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. at 9 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2017)). 
 114.  See Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, 207 SCI. AM. 93, 93 (1962) 
(stating cognitive dissonance theory “centers around the idea that if a person knows 
various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a 
variety of ways, try to make them more consistent”). 
 115. Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 9. 
 116.  See David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9 (2013) (“Defamation, which encompasses both libel and 
slander, is a dignitary tort directed at remedying harm to a plaintiff's reputation 
caused by false statements of fact.”) 
 117.  See TRAGER, supra note 51, at 145 (“Libel law is meant to protect an 
individual’s reputation. It allows a person who believes his or her reputation has 
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it into a vehicle for judges to render feel-good, symbolic rulings that 
ostensibly promote equality and condemn prejudice. One might 
wonder, in turn, whether this is a task better left to a legislative 
body than to a lone judge hearing an individual tort case.   
Under Keosian’s view in Simmons, a plaintiff suing for libel per 
se under California Civil Code § 45a118 must do more than simply 
prove that a message conveys a defamatory meaning “without the 
necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or 
other extrinsic fact.”119 Furthermore, he must do more than just 
prove that, in Keosian’s words, “a sizeable portion of the 
population”120 views the meaning in a defamatory light. Keosian 
adds a third burden on top of these two hurdles—namely, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that judicial recognition of this meaning as 
redressable does not convey or send a message of inferiority to a 
class or group of individuals.121 
The next Part of this Article explores in greater detail the typical 
standards in American libel law for measuring and evaluating 
defamatory meaning. It also goes into more depth on the shifting of 
views about homosexuality in libel law—the closest, albeit flawed, 
analog for transgender status—by reviewing judicial opinions and 
the works of other legal scholars who have examined this evolution. 
 
II. NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS ABOUT DEFAMATORY MEANING: THE 
HEART OF DEFAMATION LAW 
 
This Part has two sections. Section A reviews the standards that 
courts commonly invoke to determine if a message conveys a 
defamatory meaning. Section B then returns to the question of 
whether falsely calling someone homosexual conveys a defamatory 
meaning, examining both case law and legal scholarship on this 
topic. That question merits further consideration here because, 
although not the same, it both approximates and sheds light on the 
issue of whether falsely labeling someone transgender is defamatory 
per se. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
been injured to file a claim against the party responsible, asking for monetary 
damages to compensate for harm and to restore his or her reputation.”). 
 118.  See Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1986) (“Libel per se is distinguished from libel per quod in Civil Code section 
45a.”). 
 119.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 2017). 
 120.  Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 6. 
 121.  Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 9. 
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A. Determining Defamatory Meaning 
 
Lyrissa Lidsky, dean of the University of Missouri School of Law, 
observed more than two decades ago that “[t]he threshold inquiry in 
every defamation action is whether the statement at issue is capable 
of a defamatory meaning.”122 As Lidsky noted, a “judge must 
determine whether the words used are ‘defamatory,’ that is, whether 
they are the type of words that have the tendency to harm 
reputation.”123 This, in turn, requires a court to make “both a 
linguistic inquiry to discover the ‘tendencies’ of words and a 
sociological inquiry to discover the attitudes and beliefs of the 
community, for what is defamatory is a function of defamation law’s 
unique conception of reputational harm.”124 
In whose eyes, then, must a person’s reputation be sullied? 
United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
opined more than one century ago that a statement must “hurt the 
plaintiff in the estimation of an important and respectable part of 
the community.”125 Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
holds that a message conveys a defamatory meaning if it harms an 
individual’s reputation in the eyes of “a substantial and respectable 
minority” of the community.126   
Neither Holmes nor the Restatement, therefore, mandates that 
the statement must hurt a person’s reputation in the eyes of a 
majority of the community. As Holmes put it, “liability is not a 
question of a majority vote.”127 Ultimately, as Rodney Smolla 
observes, Holmes’ approach in Peck “became the prevailing 
American view.”128 Some courts have slightly tweaked the standard 
by substituting “considerable and respectable”129 for “important and 
respectable.”130  
New York applies a right-thinking person approach for 
evaluating defamatory meaning. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                                                
 
 122.  Lidsky, supra note 67, at 11 (citing Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284 
(N.J. 1988)). 
 123.  Id. (citing MARE A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 
196, 201, 203 (5th ed. 1995)). 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909). 
 126.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 127.  Peck, 214 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added). 
 128.  RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:4 (2d ed., 2008).  
 129.  Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 125 (1st Cir. 2006). In Stanton, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied Massachusetts’ defamation law. 
Id. at 124–25.   
 130.  Peck, 214 U.S. at 190. 
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Second Circuit recently wrote in Elias v. Rolling Stone,131 the 
question in the Empire State is whether a statement would “expose 
the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or 
induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking 
persons.”132 Kentucky also applies a right-thinking person 
standard.133 
In California, the venue for Simmons, the state’s Supreme Court 
held that what matters is “the impact of communications between 
ordinary human beings”134 and “the natural and probable effect upon 
the mind of the average reader.”135 But as Judge Robert Sack points 
out in his treatise on libel, the nature of the audience for whom a 
message is intended affects who constitutes the average reader.136 
He contends that “[c]ommunications are thus judged on the basis of 
the impact that they will probably have on those who are likely to 
receive them.”137   
In Simmons, that means average readers of the National 
Enquirer. Therefore, one would need to determine if an 
important/substantial and respectable minority of average readers of 
the National Enquirer would consider falsely labeling someone 
transgender to be defamatory. According to the tabloid’s 2018 media 
kit, the median age and household income of a National Enquirer 
reader are 52.3 years and $60,942,138 and 62% of readers are 
female.139 
  
                                                                                                                                
 
 131.  872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 132.  Id. at 104 (quoting Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co., 120 A.D.3d 28, 34 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014)). 
 133.  CMI, Inc. v. Intoximeters, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (W.D. Ky. 1995). 
 134.  MacLeod v. Tribune Publ’g Co., 343 P.2d 36, 44 (Cal. 1959). 
 135.  Id. at 41–42.  
 136.  SACK, supra note 10, § 2:4.3. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  According to a September 2017 report by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
$60,942 figure is just slightly above the country’s median household income figure of 
$59,039 from 2016. JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/P60-
259.pdf. 
 139.  National Enquirer 2018 Media Kit, NAT’L ENQUIRER (2017), 
https://www.americanmediainc.com/sites/americanmediainc.com/files/2018_NEQ_M
EDIA_KIT_r.pdf.  
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B. False Imputations of Homosexuality: Analyzing Recent 
Judicial Rulings and Legal Scholarship 
 
As addressed in Part I, the National Enquirer and Judge 
Keosian both relied on shifting judicial winds regarding whether a 
false accusation of homosexuality is defamatory per se. This section 
initially examines three cases in which courts determined that this 
label is no longer defamatory per se. It then analyzes legal 
scholarship that both praises and criticizes such rulings. 
 
1. The Cases 
 
This subsection surveys a trio of cases in which courts held that 
falsely labeling someone homosexual was not defamatory per se: 
Albright v. Morton,140 Stern v. Cosby,141 and Cornelius-Millan v. 
Caribbean University, Inc.142 These decisions were chosen for 
analysis because they not only come from different jurisdictions but 
also because they cut across a significant swath of time, spanning 
from 2004 through 2016. Exploring these opinions, from oldest to 
most recent, illuminates the judges’ reasons for abandoning 
precedent and casting aside the principle of stare decisis143 in a post-
Lawrence world.  
  
                                                                                                                                
 
 140.  321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 
410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 141.  645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 142.  261 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D.P.R. 2016). 
 143.  See Richard M. Garner, Flexible Predictability: Stare Decisis in Ohio, 48 
AKRON L. REV. 15, 15 (2015) (observing that the doctrine of stare decisis “holds that 
similar cases should be decided by similar legal principles rather than by the 
personal views of an ever-changing judiciary”); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the 
Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2015) (noting that “essence 
of stare decisis is a preference for keeping faith with the past”); Larry J. Pittman, 
The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory 
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 811 
(2002) (noting that “for opinions involving statutory interpretation, the Court 
employs a presumption against the overruling of precedent, as an essential feature of 
its stare decisis doctrine”). 
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a. Albright v. Morton 
 
Albright, decided in 2004, arose under Massachusetts law.144 It 
centered on a claim by James Albright, a former bodyguard and love 
interest of pop icon Madonna, that the book Madonna was 
defamatory per se because Albright’s name was mistakenly used to 
identify another person—an openly gay man—in a photograph.145   
In Massachusetts, “whether a communication is reasonably 
susceptible of a defamatory meaning is a question of law for the 
court.”146 United States District Judge Nancy Gertner, exercising 
this power, bluntly rejected Albright’s theory.147 She concluded—just 
one year after the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas148 
struck down an anti-sodomy statute—that “[i]n 2004, a statement 
implying that an individual is a homosexual is hardly capable of a 
defamatory meaning.”149 
Lawrence proved crucial to Gertner’s conclusion. Under 
Massachusetts law, “the imputation of a crime is defamatory per 
se, requiring no proof of special damages.”150 Indeed, Gertner noted 
that “the large majority of the courts that have found an accusation 
of homosexuality to be defamatory per se emphasized the fact that 
such a statement imputed criminal conduct.”151 Lawrence, she found, 
“extinguished” this rationale.152 
In addition to relying on Lawrence, Gertner turned to a broader 
public policy rationale in ruling against Albright—namely, that 
judicial recognition of homosexuality as a defamatory per se 
allegation would be tantamount to “relegating homosexuals to 
second-class status.”153 Thus, while readily acknowledging “that a 
segment of the community views homosexuals as immoral,”154 she 
reasoned “that courts should not, directly or indirectly, give effect to 
these prejudices.”155 To further elucidate this point, Gertner framed 
                                                                                                                                
 
 144.  See Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 134–35 (D. Mass 2004) 
(setting forth the general principles of Massachusetts defamation law applicable in 
the case). 
 145.  Id. at 132. 
 146.  Phelan v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 819 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Mass. 2004). 
 147.  Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 132. 
 148.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 149.  Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 132.  
 150.  Phelan, 819 N.E.2d at 554. 
 151.  Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id. at 138. 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id.  
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her decision in a historical context: “[I]f Albright claimed that he was 
a white person wrongfully labeled African-American, the statement 
would not be defamation per se, even if segments of the community 
still held profoundly racist attitudes.”156  
Finally, Gertner stressed that “the category ‘defamation per se’ 
should be reserved for statements linking an individual to the 
category of persons ‘deserving of social approbation’ like a ‘thief, 
murderer, prostitute, etc.’”157 The notion that homosexuals belong 
among those groups, Gertner made clear, “is nothing short of 
outrageous.”158 She added that Albright was simply “trading in the 
same kinds of stereotypes that recent case law and good sense 
disparage.”159 
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed 
the decision.160 The First Circuit, however, simply found that the 
miscaptioned photograph did not impute homosexuality to 
Albright.161 The appellate court, thus, did “not decide whether such 
an imputation constitutes defamation per se in Massachusetts.”162 
 
b. Stern v. Cosby 
 
Stern, which was decided in 2009, arose under New York 
defamation law.163 It pivoted on attorney Howard K. Stern’s claim 
that Rita Cosby’s “explosive tell-all book,”164 Blonde Ambition: The 
Untold Story Behind Anna Nicole Smith’s Death, falsely imputed he 
was gay and that this allegation was defamatory per se.165 
Specifically, the book alleged that: (1) Stern and Larry Birkhead, the 
father of the child of Stern’s late wife Anna Nicole Smith,166 had oral 
                                                                                                                                
 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 139 (quoting Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. App. 1991)).   
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 161.  Id. at 73. 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  See Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“I begin by 
discussing the legal standard applicable to a defamation claim under New 
York law.”). 
 164.  Christina Boyle, Anna Guys in Book Bombshell, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 
2, 2007, at 2. 
 165.  Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
 166.  Smith, a former Playboy magazine centerfold who later went on to star in a 
reality television show and become a spokesperson for TrimSpa supplements, died at 
thirty-nine years of age in Florida in early 2007. Abby Goodnough & Margalit Fox, 
Anna Nicole Smith is Found Dead at a Florida Hotel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at 
A12. 
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sex at a party; (2) Smith regularly watched a video of Stern and 
Birkhead having sex; and (3) Smith called Stern gay.167 United 
States District Judge Denny Chin ultimately found the statements 
were “not defamatory per se merely because they impute 
homosexuality to Stern.”168 
Whether a statement is defamatory per se in New York is a 
question of law for a judge to decide.169 New York’s highest appellate 
court holds that a statement is defamatory per se, such that proof of 
special damages is unnecessary, “if it tends to expose a person to 
hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory 
opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number of the 
community, even though it may impute no moral turpitude to 
him.”170 This determination “depends, among other factors, upon the 
temper of the times, the current of contemporary public opinion, 
with the result that words, harmless in one age, in one community, 
may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a 
different place.”171 As Chin aptly noted in Stern, “whether a 
statement is defamatory per se can evolve from one generation to the 
next.”172 
Chin largely based his opinion on the principle that what is 
defamatory per se is transitory. He asserted that “[t]he past few 
decades have seen a veritable sea change in social attitudes about 
homosexuality.”173 Chin pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas174 that overturned an anti-sodomy 
law—the same type of statute courts previously relied on to find 
false allegations of homosexuality were defamatory due to an 
association with criminal behavior.175 Furthermore, Chin cited a 
then-recent poll indicating that a majority of New Yorkers supported 
gay marriage as evidence they also would not regard allegations of 
homosexuality as something that would expose a person to 
“contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace.”176  
                                                                                                                                
 
 167.  Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
 168.  Id. at 275. 
 169.  Geraci v. Probst, 938 N.E.2d 917, 922 (N.Y. 2010). 
 170.  Mencher v. Chesley, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. 1947) (citing Katapodis v. 
Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 38 N.E.2d 112, 113 (N.Y. 1941)). 
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 273. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 175.  Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 273–74. 
 176.  Id. at 274. 
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This ruling contravened another decision from the same federal 
district in New York just one year prior.177 In that case, Judge 
Colleen McMahon largely attributed her decision to widespread 
homophobia and prejudice gays and lesbians continued to face.178 
Addressing his deviation, Chin explained:  
 
I respectfully disagree that the existence of this continued 
prejudice leads to the conclusion that there is a widespread 
view of gays and lesbians as contemptible and disgraceful. 
Moreover, the fact of such prejudice on the part of some does 
not warrant a judicial holding that gays and lesbians, merely 
because of their sexual orientation, belong in the same class 
as criminals.179 
 
Ultimately, while Chin held that false allegations of 
homosexuality are not defamatory per se, he allowed Stern to 
proceed on other claims.180 The case settled in November 2009 for an 
undisclosed sum of money.181  
 
c. Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean University, Inc. 
 
Cornelius-Millan, which was decided in 2016, applied Puerto 
Rican defamation law.182 The case centered on whether it was 
slanderous per se for a professor to call his student “homosexual.”183 
Although U.S. Magistrate Judge Bruce McGiverin dismissed the 
defamation cause of action on other grounds,184 he held that “falsely 
accusing someone of being a homosexual can no longer be considered 
slander per se.”185 
                                                                                                                                
 
 177.  Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa Per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d 
520, 549–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (citing Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 
130, 138 (D. Mass. 2004)). 
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Bruce Golding, Anna Lawyer Settles Gay Suit, N.Y. POST, Nov. 21, 2009, at 
7.  
 182.  See Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean Univ., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 143, 154 
(D.P.R. 2016) (reviewing key principles and sources of defamation law in Puerto 
Rico). 
 183.  Id. at 155–56. 
 184.  See id. at 154–55 (noting that case law has established that face-to-face 
altercations involving name-calling and epithets are not considered defamatory). 
 185.  Id. at 156. 
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As with the judges in Albright and Stern described above, 
McGiverin relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s Lawrence v. 
Texas186 decision in reaching this conclusion.187 In doing so, 
McGiverin cited favorably for support the rulings in both Albright 
and Stern.188 Specifically, he cited those cases to buttress twin 
propositions—namely, that:  
 
 • “Lawrence has extinguished the rationale underlying 
cases”189 that previously held it defamatory per se to label 
someone homosexual because it imputed criminal conduct; 
and   
 • “[R]ecent case law holds that falsely accusing a person 
of being a homosexual is not slander per se.”190 
 
In brief, there was a growing body of decisions by 2016 such as 
Albright and Stern on which McGiverin could rely to make his ruling 
slightly easier and less controversial than those that came before it 
on the same question. With these three cases in mind, the next 
subsection examines legal scholarship addressing the nexus between 
defamation per se and false allegations of homosexuality.  
 
2. The Scholarship 
 
The cases above illustrate that the judicial tide is turning 
against branding false imputations of homosexuality defamatory per 
se.191 Some scholars laud this change for embracing societal and 
legal advances and removing what amounted to court-sanctioned 
discrimination.192 Other experts, however, criticize these opinions for 
allegedly ignoring lingering problems that gays and lesbians face 
today.193 
  
                                                                                                                                
 
 186.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 187.  Cornelius-Millan, 261 F. Supp. 3d at 155–56. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 155 (citing Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 192.  See infra Part II.B.2.a.  
 193.  See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
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a. Praise for Eliminating Defamatory Per Se Status for False 
Assertions of Homosexuality  
 
Professor Matthew Bunker observes in a 2011 article that courts 
increasingly are “taking judicial notice of changing social attitudes 
toward alternative sexualities.”194 And just as the judiciary evolved 
in racial misidentification cases, Bunker argues that “public policy 
should not permit the law to symbolically endorse discriminatory 
attitudes or conduct, even if such attitudes are common.”195 Why? 
Because “[t]he imprimatur of the law is a powerful symbolic force 
that normalizes certain social understandings,”196 and “[b]asing legal 
decisions on discriminatory beliefs and behaviors, whether in libel 
law or child custody cases, validates those beliefs and behaviors.”197 
Bunker, therefore, offers a bright-line proposal. Specifically, he 
posits that unlike false imputations regarding “voluntary 
misconduct or malfeasance,”198 those targeting an immutable 
characteristic—race, sexual preference, illness, or disability, for 
example—or an involuntary status must never carry a defamatory 
meaning.199 He insists that courts adopt this standard “regardless of 
a judge’s or a jury’s sense of how the Restatement’s ‘substantial and 
respectable’ group of so-called right-thinking citizens would view a 
statement.”200 In a nutshell, Bunker avers that defamatory injuries 
based on immutable traits must cede to equality interests in order to 
prevent a judicial stamp of approval on social stigma and 
discrimination.201 
This tack is necessary, Bunker contends, because even though 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in Lawrence v. Texas202 
eliminated the “criminal foundation”203 for holding false allegations 
of homosexuality defamatory per se, “some post-Lawrence courts 
                                                                                                                                
 
 194.  Matthew D. Bunker et al., Not That There’s Anything Wrong with That: 
Imputations of Homosexuality and the Normative Structure of Defamation Law, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 581, 601 (2011).  
 195.  Id. at 602.  
 196.  Id. at 608 
 197.  Id.  
 198.  Id. at 603. 
 199.  Id.  
 200.  Id.; see also id. at 609 (“Our proposal suggests that courts decline to 
recognize as defamatory statements that stigmatize a class of persons based on some 
immutable characteristic or involuntary status.”). 
 201.  Id. at 608. 
 202.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 203.  Bunker, supra note 194, at 590. 
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have still applied pre-Lawrence precedent.”204 These courts “continue 
to find the false imputation of homosexuality to be defamatory per se 
solely on the grounds that it either implies unchastity, or has the 
tendency to expose a person to public hatred, contempt or 
ridicule.”205 
Professors Courtney Joslin and Lawrence Levine hail the rulings 
in lower court cases such as Albright206 as consistent with both legal 
and social strides made by the lesbian and gay community.207 In a 
2014 article, they explain that “in light of both cultural and 
constitutional law developments, it is hard to justify a rule that 
permits a false imputation of LGBT status to be defamatory.”208 As 
with Professor Bunker, they analogize this change to a false 
imputation that a white person was black—a statement no longer 
defamatory per se.209 
Joslin and Levine further call for the American Law Institute 
(the publisher of the Restatement (Second) of Torts) to adopt the 
approach taken by recent courts:  
 
If and when the [American Law Institute] revisits the tort of 
defamation, the ALI should explicitly endorse the emerging 
trend in the case law and make clear that, as is true for false 
imputations of race, false imputations of homosexuality 
should not give rise to a cognizable defamation claim. A 
determination that sexual-orientation defamation cannot be 
actionable would be a substantial step toward recognizing 
the dignity of the LGBT community.210 
 
This recommendation, they believe, would “clarify one of the 
most complex and confused areas of American tort law.”211 
Pointing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawrence v. 
Texas212 as eliminating the criminal-conduct justification for holding 
false imputations of homosexuality to be defamatory per se,213 
                                                                                                                                
 
 204.  Id.  
 205.  Id. at 591. 
 206.  See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 
(D. Mass. 2004)). 
 207.  Courtney G. Joslin & Lawrence C. Levine, The Restatement of Gay(?), 
BROOK. L. REV. 621, 660 (2014). 
 208.  Id. at 659. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 661. 
 211.  Id. at 658. 
 212.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 213.  See Barth, supra note 68, at 538. 
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Professor Jay Barth contends “there is no continuing justification for 
deeming false imputation of an individual as being gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual defamatory even in locales where ‘community standards’ 
exhibit sharply negative attitudes about LGB individuals.”214 He 
adds that “gay defamation cases serve only as state-driven 
perpetuation of denigration of sexual minorities in direct conflict 
with the trajectory of American law regarding sexual orientation.”215 
Similarly, attorney Haven Ward argues that decisions holding 
allegations of homosexuality to be defamatory are wrong because 
this stance “endorses homophobia and demeans the lives of 
homosexuals. Due to our country’s firm commitment to civil rights 
and opprobrium of invidious prejudice, judges should hold the false 
imputation of homosexuality non-defamatory as a matter of law.”216   
In summary, many scholars have advocated for eliminating 
defamatory per se status for false allegations of homosexuality. Yet, 
as noted below, other scholars—albeit writing more than a half-
decade ago—have cautioned against this change. 
 
b. Arguments Against Removing Defamatory Per Se Status for 
False Allegations of Homosexuality 
 
Wary of the judiciary jumping the gun, Professor Robert D. 
Richards contended in 2010 that there was still some time to go 
before libel law could truly reflect the cultural realities of 
contemporary society.217 He cautioned that courts should “avoid 
creating legal fictions of society having reached some aspirational 
level of tolerance” that is not yet prevalent.218 Richards explained 
that “sizable pockets of society still hold gays and lesbians to the 
obloquy, ridicule, and contempt that define defamation per se”219 and 
that judicial denial of this fact “does not eradicate that prejudice 
from reality.”220  
Likewise, Professor David Ardia emphasized in a 2010 article 
that societal “norms do not change overnight.”221 He noted that 
“[w]hen even members of the LGBT community are conflicted over 
                                                                                                                                
 
 214.  Id. at 548. 
 215.  Id.  
 216.  Ward, supra note 65, at 767.  
 217.  Richards, supra note 10, at 368.  
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Id. at 369.  
 220.  Id.  
 221.  David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social 
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 298 (2010).  
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which strategy to pursue in their efforts to change social norms, 
judges seem especially ill-equipped to make these decisions, 
particularly when they are doing so through guise of defamation 
law.”222 Despite benevolent intentions by courts, Ardia explains that 
“judges are forced to decide whether they should take society as it 
exists, warts and all, or as they desire it to be.”223 Indeed, this taps 
directly into the dilemma faced by Judge Keosian in Simmons v. 
American Media, Inc. 
Ultimately, decisions like Lawrence v. Texas224 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges225 are clear victories for the rights of gays and lesbians and 
signal judicial opprobrium and disdain for holding false allegations 
of homosexuality defamatory per se. They do not mean, however, 
that transgender individuals no longer face blatant discrimination 
and stigmatization.   
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cogently 
observed in 2015, “laws recognizing same-sex marriage may do little 
to protect a transgender woman . . . from discrimination, police 
harassment, and violent attacks in daily life.”226 The Ninth Circuit 
added that “significant evidence suggests that transgender persons 
are often especially visible, and vulnerable, to harassment and 
persecution due to their often public nonconformance with normative 
gender roles.”227 
The next Part of this Article moves beyond the legal realm to 
analyze data and other evidence about societal attitudes and actions 
toward transgender individuals. It is essential to review this 
material because it may indicate that falsely labeling someone 
transgender still harms that person’s reputation today in the eyes of 
a considerable and respectable segment of the American population. 
  
                                                                                                                                
 
 222.  Id. at 300. 
 223.  Id. at 300–01.  
 224.  539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 225.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In Obergefell, the Court concluded that: 
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to 
marry in all States.  It follows that the Court also must 
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same-sex character. 
Id. at 2607–08.  
 226.  Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 227.  Id. at 1081. 




III. TRANSGENDER AND PUBLIC SENTIMENT: SEARCHING FOR SHIFTING 
ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS OF ACCEPTANCE 
 
In holding that it was no longer defamatory per se to falsely call 
a person homosexual in 2012, a New York appellate court 
emphasized what it called “the tremendous evolution in social 
attitudes regarding homosexuality.”228 Similarly, in ruling against 
Howard K. Stern in Stern v. Cosby,229 U.S. District Judge Denny 
Chin cited “a veritable sea change in social attitudes about 
homosexuality.”230 Has there been, however, a similar “tremendous 
evolution” and “veritable sea change” in societal attitudes today 
toward transgender individuals—an evolution sufficient enough to 
jettison false allegations of transgender status from the domain of 
defamatory per se statements? 
A fitting starting point for examining this query and, in turn, 
modern attitudes and actions toward231 transgender individuals is 
definitional: What exactly does transgender mean? 
A 2017 article in the Journal of Endocrinological Investigation 
provides that “transgenderism is an umbrella term describing 
individuals whose gender identity, expression, or behavior can differ 
from those typically associated with their assigned gender.”232 
                                                                                                                                
 
 228.  Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
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PAC. L.J. 933, 940 (1995) (“While reputational harm may take the form of negative 
attitudes and opinions, it also includes changes in physical conduct or behavior 
toward the plaintiff.”).  
 232.  A.D. Fisher et al., Who Has the Worst Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities? 
Comparison of Transphobia and Homophobia Levels in Gender Dysphoric 
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Similarly, the National Center for Transgender Equality defines 
transgender as “[a] term for people whose gender identity, 
expression or behavior is different from those typically associated 
with their assigned sex at birth. Transgender is a broad term and is 
good for non-transgender people to use.”233   
The notion that transgender is an expansive label is echoed by 
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) National Help 
Center. It describes transgender as an: 
 
umbrella term that includes different things, all having to do 
with gender identity. This can include someone who 
occasionally enjoys dressing in the clothing of the opposite 
sex (cross-dresser) or someone who knows that the gender 
that they feel on the inside of their body does not match the 
gender that they appear to be on the outside of their body 
(transsexual).234 
 
More specifically, a transgender man is “a transgender person 
who currently identifies as a man,”235 while a transgender woman is 
“a transgender person who currently identifies as a woman.”236 
With these definitions in mind, the pivotal issue in libel cases is 
whether it is defamatory in 2018 to falsely state that someone is 
transgender. In other words, is being transgender something that 
might, under the California law applicable in Simmons, cause a 
person to be: (1) hated, ridiculed, or treated with contempt; (2) 
shunned or avoided; or (3) injured in his or her occupation?237 
Although there is a paucity of comprehensive survey research in 
the United States today on attitudes toward transgender 
individuals,238 the answer appears to be a resounding yes. 
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Transphobia is a “prejudice against gender nonconforming 
persons”239 and “an emotional disgust toward”240 such individuals. It 
“manifests itself in the fear that personal acquaintances may be 
trans or disgust upon encountering a trans person”241 and percolates 
through society.   
As a 2015 article in Sociological Forum encapsulates it, 
“transgender people are systematically oppressed and experience 
high rates of discrimination and violence in the United States.”242 
Similarly, a 2016 article in the scholarly journal Sex Roles asserts 
that while “contemporary U.S. society struggles with accepting 
diversity in various human characteristics, deviations from the norm 
in terms of sexuality and gender tend to incite particularly strong 
and persistent negative reactions.”243  
There are, of course, several high-profile indicators that 
transgender status is stigmatized. These include President Donald 
Trump’s effort in 2017 to ban transgender people from military 
service,244 as well as ongoing battles over bathroom access.245 A 
                                                                                                                                
 
Transgender Persons, 17 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165, 165 (2016) (noting that 
“research into attitudes toward transgender persons sorely lags behind research into 
attitudes toward lesbians and gays”); Yasuko Kanamori et al., Development and 
Validation of the Transgender Attitudes and Beliefs Scale, 46 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 1503, 1503 (2017) (calling it “surprising to note that only five empirical 
studies of U.S. attitudes toward transgender persons have been conducted in the last 
decade”).  
 239.  Kanamori et al., supra note 238, at 1504. 
 240.  Darryl B. Hill & Brian L.B. Willoughby, The Development and Validation 
of the Genderism and Transphobia Scale, 53 SEX ROLES 531, 533 (2005). 
 241.  Id. at 533–34. 
 242.  Lisa R. Miller & Eric Anthony Grollman, The Social Costs of Gender 
Nonconformity for Transgender Adults: Implications for Discrimination and Health, 
30 SOC. F. 809, 809 (2015). 
 243.  Holger B. Elischberger et al., “Boys Don’t Cry”—or Do They? Adult 
Attitudes Toward and Beliefs About Transgender Youth, 75 SEX ROLES 197, 197 
(2016). 
 244.  Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Helene Cooper, Trump Surprises Military with a 
Transgender Ban, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2017, at A1. Trump’s effort ultimately failed. 
Spencer S. Hsu & Ann E. Marimow, Judge Rejects Delay of Trans Military 
Recruiting, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2017, at A3.  The government’s legal efforts to stay 
the trial court’s injunction against the ban were blocked by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia. Doe v. Trump, No. 17-5267, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26477, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017). Trump voluntarily dismissed his appeal in 
January 2018. Doe v. Trump, No. 17-5267, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 296, at *3–4 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 4, 2018). 
 245.  Richard Fausset, Deal on Bathroom Law Would 
Expand Transgender Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2017, at A15. See generally 
Stephen Rushin & Jenny Carroll, Bathroom Laws as Status Crimes, 86 FORDHAM L. 
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recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine emphasizes 
that laws such as North Carolina’s now-repealed bathroom statute246 
“send a message that transgender people are not welcome in 
workplaces or schools, reinforcing the stigma, bias and fear that fuel 
discrimination against transgender people.”247 Indeed, a 2016 Pew 
Research Center study reveals that a substantial minority of those 
surveyed would discriminate against transgender individuals by 
requiring them to use a bathroom matching their gender at birth:  
 
About half of U.S. adults (51%) say transgender individuals 
should be allowed to use public restrooms that correspond 
with the gender they currently identify with . . . . But nearly 
as many (46%) take the opposite position—on the side of the 
North Carolina law—and say transgender people should be 
required to use bathrooms that match the gender they were 
born into.248 
 
The markers and signs that being transgender carries the 
likelihood of being ridiculed, shunned, or harmed in one’s 
occupation, however, stretch far beyond such legal skirmishes. 
For instance, USA Today in January 2018 reported the results of 
a Harris poll which found that “[f]or the first time in four years, 
Americans are less accepting of LGBTQ people.”249 Specifically, 31% 
of those surveyed said they would be either uncomfortable or very 
uncomfortable having their child placed in a class with an LGBTQ 
teacher.250 Furthermore, 31% said they would be either 
uncomfortable or very uncomfortable learning their doctor was 
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LGBTQ.251 These figures indicate that a false allegation of being 
transgender would harm one in the occupational roles of both 
teacher and doctor among a respectable and significant minority of 
the population. 
GLAAD, the organization that commissioned the poll noted 
immediately above, argues that “acceptance of LGBTQ people is 
slipping, and discrimination is increasing, in the face of attacks, 
bias, and erasure by the Trump administration.”252 Sarah Kate Ellis, 
GLAAD’s president and chief executive officer, contends the “change 
[could] be seen as a dangerous repercussion in the tenor of discourse 
and experience over the last year.”253 She points here to anti-LGBTQ 
headlines regarding Trump’s proposed transgender military ban, 
recently confirmed Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opposition 
to marriage equality, and the religious freedom law passed in 
Mississippi.254 
Marketing research firm Ipsos released a report in January 2018 
that compared attitudes toward transgender individuals in sixteen 
countries around the world.255 Disturbingly, it found that: 
 
Among western countries, the United States is most likely to 
believe that transgender people have a mental illness (32%) 
and the most likely out of all countries surveyed to believe 
that transgendered people are committing a sin (32%). 
Americans are the most likely to say that society has gone too 
far in allowing people to dress and live as one sex even 
though they were born another (36%).256 
 
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights released a report in 
November 2017257 that brings into high relief how being falsely 
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labeled transgender harms a person in his occupation: 
LGBT individuals often face lower wages, increased difficulty 
in finding jobs, promotion denials, and/or job terminations 
due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. Studies 
have found that anywhere from 21 to 47 percent of LGBT 
adults faced employment discrimination because they were 
gay or transgender. A summary of numerous studies of 
LGBT employee survey respondents showed that ten to 28 
percent reported receiving negative performance evaluations 
or were passed over for promotion because they were gay or 
transgender, and seven to 41 percent experienced verbal 
and/or physical abuse in the workplace. More staggering is 
that 90 percent of transgender employees report experiencing 
some form of harassment or mistreatment on the job.258  
 
Such hard data about workplace discrimination against 
transgender individuals only scratch the surface of a deeper 
problem. As a column in The New York Times recently noted: 
 
Statistics regarding transgender people who lose their jobs 
because of their gender identities reveal only the cases in 
which such bias was blatant. Lost within these numbers are 
the more ambiguous stories—of managers who may have 
rejected a request for a uniform that reflected an employee’s 
gender, workers terminated for requests to change their 
names on internal documents or employees whose presence 
was shown, through the actions of colleagues and superiors, 
to be unwelcome.259 
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Likewise, negative perceptions of transgender individuals can 
have detrimental effects in healthcare. Although progress has been 
made,260 at least eight studies dating from 1992 through 2010 
revealed a positive correlation between nurses’ negative attitudes 
toward LGBT patients and reduced willingness to care for them.261 A 
survey conducted by the National Center for Transgender Equality 
in 2015 found that one-third of transgender individuals who saw a 
healthcare provider the prior year reported at least one negative 
experience, such as “being refused treatment, verbally harassed, or 
physically or sexually assaulted, or having to teach the provider 
about transgender people in order to get appropriate care.”262 
Additionally, the study reported that nearly a quarter of respondents 
elected not to see a doctor, even when they needed care, because they 
feared being mistreated.263 
Negative attitudes toward transgender individuals often are 
unintentionally communicated. A 2016 review in the Journal of Sex 
Research categorizes the immense impact of microaggressions as 
“subtle, often unconscious forms of discrimination.”264 
Microaggressions are further defined as “behaviors and statements, 
often unconscious or unintentional, that communicate hostile or 
derogatory messages, particularly to members of targeted social 
groups.”265 A 2015 study found that a whopping 71% of transgender 
individuals surveyed reported everyday transphobic 
discrimination.266 The perpetuation of microaggressions, although 
inadvertent, can lead to “a multitude of potential negative 
implications.”267 
Persistent intolerant behavior manifests itself in detrimental 
ways among the transgender population. For example, a 2016 article 
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in the New England Journal of Medicine links discrimination to 
“increased stress, anxiety, depressive symptoms, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, substance abuse, and suicide”268 among transgender 
victims.  
In fact, multiple studies from the past decade demonstrate that 
targeted prejudice often leads to post-traumatic stress disorder, 
higher rates of depression, and anxiety.269 In their 2017 article 
published in the Journal of Clinical Nursing, Edward McCann and 
Michael Brown conclude that “transgender people continue to 
experience ongoing and significant challenges in terms of their social 
inclusion, discrimination, sexual identity, social isolation and the 
associated impact on their mental health and the development of 
mental illness.”270 
Psychologist Holger Elischberger and his colleagues suggest that 
“[p]rogress on transgender issues lags farther behind, perhaps owing 
to the small number of transgendered people, which has translated 
into less visibility and advocacy, at least up until very recently.”271 
Political scientist Andrew Flores echoes this sentiment, noting that 
“[t]he transgender community did not emerge as an organized 
political movement in the United States until the 1990s.”272 In other 
words, the gay rights movement has a much longer history in the 
United States and has, in turn, been able to influence and change 
public opinion over a greater period of time. 
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Recent data from the first national probability sample of 
heterosexual U.S. adults indicated widespread negative attitudes 
regarding transgender individuals and attributed its results to 
Americans’ binary conception of gender.273 These views stem from 
deep-seated societal standards reinforced by “psychological 
authoritarianism, political conservatism and anti-egalitarianism, 
and (for women) religiosity,”274 as well as a general “lack of personal 
contact with sexual minorities.”275  
Sociologists Laurel Westbrook and Kristen Schilt coined the term 
“gender panics” as a result of society’s inability to reconcile how 
transgender men and women fit into gender-divided spaces.276 They 
define gender panics as “situations where people react to disruptions 
to biology-based gender ideology by frantically reasserting the 
naturalness of a male-female binary” such as recent public restroom 
debates.277 
Critically, courts openly acknowledge the discrimination and 
stigma today that are attached to being transgender. Writing in 
2015 in Adkins v. City of New York,278 U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff 
opined that “transgender people have suffered a history of 
persecution and discrimination. . . . Moreover, this history of 
persecution and discrimination is not yet history.”279 Rakoff added 
that “transgender people often face backlash in everyday life when 
their status is discovered.”280   
Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
observed the same year that “transgender persons are caught in the 
crosshairs of both generalized homophobia and transgender-specific 
violence and discrimination.”281 Similarly, a federal district court in 
Wisconsin recognized in 2014 that “[d]espite the strides in 
acceptance that transgender and intersex persons have made in 
American society, it is unfortunately true that they have been 
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unfairly stigmatized, and that someone publically [sic] labeled a 
hermaphrodite could, however unjustly, face a loss of reputation.”282  
Viewed collectively, all of these data points, surveys, 
observations, and other pieces of evidence readily help to answer the 
question posed in the opening paragraph of this Part: unlike recent 
shifts in opinions about homosexuals, there has been neither a 
“tremendous evolution”283 nor a “veritable sea change”284 in societal 
attitudes toward transgender individuals that is sufficient—at least, 
standing alone—to jettison false allegations of transgender status 
from the province of defamatory per se statements. 
With this review of the persistent negative attitudes and actions 
that transgender individuals confront today in mind, the Article next 
turns to the Conclusion. It proposes variables for judicial 
consideration in cases such as Simmons where the legal system’s 
desire not to endorse or ratify prejudice and discrimination conflicts 
with an individual’s need to recover damages stemming from harm 




This Article examined the 2017 decision in Simmons v. American 
Media, Inc. regarding defamation per se and transgender status. The 
Article situated Judge Gregory Keosian’s ruling against fitness 
aficionado Richard Simmons within a broad framework. That 
context included both case law and legal scholarship on the 
imperfect, ill-fitting analogy to false allegations of homosexuality,285 
given that gender identity and sexual orientation simply are not the 
same.286 Additionally, the Article offered social science data, 
government reports, and scholarly articles describing attitudes and 
actions towards transgender individuals in the United States.287 
As Part III evidenced, transphobia remains a stubborn, troubling 
problem. Transgender adults and minors288 routinely confront 
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stigma and discrimination. Data described in Part III clearly 
indicate that a false allegation of transgender status today harms a 
person’s reputation in the eyes of a considerable and respectable 
minority of the population—the gold standard for defamatory 
meaning in American libel law.289   
There simply has not been the same type of positive change in 
attitudes and actions toward transgender individuals that there has 
been in recent decades toward gays and lesbians. As a 2017 article in 
Political Research Quarterly reported, “the public is less likely to 
support discrimination protections for transgender people in 
comparison with gay men and lesbians,”290 and people “on average, 
expressed warmer feelings toward gays and lesbians compared with 
transgender people.”291 The researchers added that “[w]hile attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians have become increasingly positive in 
recent years, feelings toward transgender people remain cooler.”292 
Judges in defamation cases who nonchalantly gloss over the 
differences between attitudes toward gays and lesbians, on the one 
hand, and transgender individuals, on the other, are mistaken. 
Simmons v. American Media, Inc., thus, sits at a dangerous 
intersection. Consider it a crossroads where a noble judicial desire to 
reject prejudicial stereotypes and to embrace equality collides head-
on with an ignoble reality in which a significant minority of the 
population finds a false allegation (in Simmons, transgender status) 
to be defamatory. The wreckage, in turn, is reputational injury. 
What should a judge do in this situation? Sacrifice the reputation 
of an individual plaintiff like Richard Simmons at the altar of a 
larger societal good of equality? Or allow a plaintiff to recover today 
and postpone until later—after public opinion and attitudes have 
meaningfully and measurably shifted and solidified in a positive 
direction—before sending an egalitarian signal? In other words, 
when should a judge, faced with the discomfiting fact that a 
substantial minority of the population still views a particular 
characteristic with disdain and disgust, nonetheless jettison that 
characteristic from defamatory per se status? 
                                                                                                                                
 
transgender students barred from school bathrooms that match their gender 
identity, a development those students say leaves them vulnerable to bullying and 
violence.”) (emphasis added). 
 289.  Supra Part II.A. 
 290.  Daniel C. Lewis et al., Degrees of Acceptance: Variation in Public Attitudes 
Toward Segments of the LGBT Community, 70 POL. RES. Q. 861, 871 (2017). 
 291.  Id.  
 292.  Id. at 872. 
1070 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85.1029 
 
There is no easy answer. A central problem here is that “norms 
do not change overnight nor are they susceptible to easy 
quantification.”293 Judges like Gregory Keosian rightfully do not 
want to endorse bigotry and hatred. The natural temptation for 
judges, therefore, is to take large leaps forward, changing 
defamation law overnight to promote the greater good of equality.  
Are there factors a judge might weigh in deciding whether it is 
too early or too soon to declare that a particular false label does not 
merit defamatory per se status? A logical starting point is for a judge 
to consider methodologically sound survey data, government reports, 
and peer-reviewed scholarly articles regarding attitudes and actions 
toward individuals who possess the allegedly defamatory 
characteristic or trait. For example, Part III of this Article set forth 
multiple data points reflecting public sentiment about and 
discrimination against individuals who are transgender.   
When reviewing such data, judges should examine several items. 
First and foremost, they should search for evidence of how a false 
allegation of possessing the characteristic in question detrimentally 
affects individuals in their occupations and professions. That is 
imperative because many states such as California—the venue for 
Simmons—define a defamatory statement in terms of one with “a 
tendency to injure him in his occupation.”294 In other words, a false 
allegation that harms a person in his job is a core facet of libel law. 
More specifically, it is a key feature of statements traditionally 
deemed defamatory per se.295 Sacrificing a person’s ability to earn a 
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living in the name of promoting equality is somewhat troubling. 
Occupational harm is far greater than just not having as many 
friends or pals due to a false allegation. It severely affects the ability 
to fiscally survive. 
It also is important to note that the phrasing of California’s 
statute simply involves a mere tendency to harm a person in his 
occupation.296 By comparison, this is not as high of a threshold such 
as substantially likely to harm or directly harm. In other words, the 
legal bar is set low for a statement to be considered defamatory in 
terms of it detrimentally affecting one’s occupation or business. This, 
in turn, should make a judge proceed cautiously before stripping a 
particular allegation of defamatory per se status. If the bar for 
harming one’s occupation is set low by statute (and thus legislative 
fiat), then a judge risks encroaching on the province of the legislative 
branch by removing from defamatory per se status an allegation 
that, in fact, tends to harm a person in his occupation. As addressed 
in Part III, a 2017 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
clearly reveals how transgender status tends to harm individuals in 
their occupations.297 This suggests Keosian erred by rejecting the 
notion that false allegations of transgender status are defamatory 
per se. 
Second, judges should scrutinize the data for clear and decisive 
evidence that societal attitudes have shifted positively toward the 
particular trait or characteristic. Such an evidentiary standard is 
akin to the “clear and convincing evidence”298 test for proving actual 
malice299 in defamation law. Relying on only one or two studies 
simply may not be sufficient to prove such an evolution or movement 
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is clear and decisive. Obviously, the greater the number of studies, 
the more justified a judge’s decision would be to remove an 
allegation from defamatory per se status. 
Third, the pattern of positive progress should be sustained over a 
significant amount of time—perhaps five years or even a decade—to 
ensure the change in opinion is neither anomalous nor fleeting. 
Stripping a particular allegation of defamatory per se status should 
not be based, in other words, on an aberration.   
In addition to examining data on public opinion and 
discrimination, judges should look beyond the confines of defamation 
law to analyze what other courts are saying about the particular 
characteristic or trait in non-defamation cases. It will be recalled, for 
instance, that several courts in disputes other than libel cases have 
described the hostility and stigma that transgender individuals face 
today.300 
Finally, judges should be cautious about making and using 
analogies to other types of assertions that once were—but no longer 
are—defamatory per se. Keosian seemingly gave short shrift to the 
differences between homosexuality and transgender status. He 
reconciled the distinction in a single, brief sentence: “Although there 
is no connection between homosexuality and being transgender, both 
characteristics relate to sex and gender.”301 As this Article made 
clear, societal views about sexual orientation and gender identity are 
not equivalent.302 
The suggestions proffered here, of course, will not end the 
predicament judges face when considering whether to eliminate—in 
the name of endorsing principles of equality—defamatory per se 
status for allegations a significant minority of the population find 
defamatory. They might, however, add rigor and a more systematic 
approach to the process. And if that proves to be the case, then 
Richard Simmons’ lawsuit against the National Enquirer will have 
been about far more than either just an individual battle to recover 
for reputational injury or a larger fight for LGBTQ rights. It will 
have helped judges in similar future cases to determine if and when 
it is appropriate to deny defamatory per se status to a false label or 
assertion. 
                                                                                                                                
 
 300.  Supra notes 278–82 and accompanying text. 
 301.  Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 8. 
 302.  Supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
